
Health Care: Let Doctors Do the Driving
This editorial from the December 21 issue of the New
England Journal of medicine is very relevant to this
discussion. I have a few excerpts from the editorial.
Please read the full article. It is a scary but true
Prophecy of things to come in medicine as the for profit
organizations aim to increae their profits and stock value.
Doctors are but mere lackeys of the corporate structure.
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Our own contracts with one health maintenance or-
ganization (HMO) state: "Physician shall agree not to
take any action or make any communication which un-
dermines or could undermine the confidence of enroll-
ees, or the public in the HMO" and "Physician shall keep
the Proprietary Information [payment rates, utilization-
review procedures, etc.] and this Agreement strictly
confidential."
This 2.4 million-member plan spends only 74.4 per-
cent of its revenues on medical care; $1 million a day
goes to profits, adding to its $1.2-billion cash reserve
Its chief executive officer pocketed $20 million in a sin-
gle year and holds $534 million in company stock.
One secret to this success is a payment formula that
binds primary care physicians' interests to the firm's.
The base capitation payment barely covers office over-
head. An internist with 1500 of the plan's patients might
take home more than $150,000 from bonuses and in-
centives, or nearly nothing. ... most (bonuses) reward limiting
care and boosting the HMO's image and enrollment.
For instance, for each dollar of emergency care, the
plan penalizes the doctor up to 50 cents.
Why these changes? In a nutshell, previous managed-
care arrangements did not sufficiently squeeze care or
expand profits.
Enter plans that tie doctors' incomes to curtailing
service. These plans shift the risk, the cost of office fa-
cilities, and malpractice liability to the doctors - either
individually (as in the case of U.S. Healthcare) or by
means of subcontracts with large groups of physicians.
At first blush, these new arrangements seem attractive.
But the financial incentives for physicians are prob-
lematic. The new risk-sharing arrangements are not
simply the inverse of fee for service. Instead, they are
the inverse of fee splitting. just as fee splitting allows
doctors paid on a fee-for-service basis to profit from
referring patients, so doctors under the new arrange-
ments can profit from not referring patients.
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The public's dim view of fee-for-service physicians
who benefit from their power to refer surfaced in "anti-
kickback" statutes. These laws ban paying doctors for
care they prescribe but do not themselves deliver. Risk
sharing what might be called fee-for-nonreferral
care - is the mirror image and ethical equivalent of
these banned practices. In both instances, secrecy in-
creases the ethical taint.
We can already glimpse the next phase. As fee-for-
service medicine withers, risk selection by HMOs will
become a zero-sum game, presaging fierce competition
among doctors to avoid sick patients. Already the chief
of a university hospital reportedly has admonished facul-
ty: "[We can] no longer tolerate patients with complex
and expensive-to-treat conditions being encouraged to
transfer to our group." Doctors who attract sick pa-
tients ....risk being ostracized from
plans and even physician groups. The gulf between clin-
ical excellence and professional success will widen.
Might risk-assuming arrangements shield us from di-
rect corporate pressures and hold at bay managers with-
out the clinical and social sensibilities of physicians?
Not likely. Doctor-managers use the same utilization
controls as other managers; 61 percent of physician
groups do not adjust for case mix, or even for patients'
age, when profiling doctors' costs, thus implicitly en-
couraging risk selection.
If 5000 physicians, roughly the number needed to care
for U.S. Healthcare's patients, invested $100,000 each,
thcir $500-million stake could not rival that HMO's
cash on hand, much less the amount in the far deeper
pockets of Prudential or United HealthCare. Capital is
essential to build the regionwide networks demanded
by large employers and for research and marketing to
identify and enroll the healthy. The biggest players can
extract the best deals from hospitals, laboratories, and
suppliers and can withstand huge early losses, a cush-
ion that allows predatory pricing to drive out compet-
itors.
The recent marriage of profit making and managed
care portends momentous changes in medicine. Virtual-
ly all sound research on the quality of care provided by
HMOs has assessed plans with salaried physicians, most
of them nonprofit, that are now being eclipsed. Only 55 per-
cent of the plans owned by insurance firms responded to
the benign survey of Gold et at. despite its sponsorship
by a congressional commission and endor{*filter*}ts by
trade associations. Such firms increasingly own the raw
data, including even patients' charts, needed for evalua-
tion. Will they allow access to potentially damning infor-
mation? Insurers' large investments in tobacco-company
stock give little evidence of social conscience.
It is hard to be a good doctor. The ways we are paid
often distort our clinical and m{*filter*}judgment and sel-
dom improve it. Extreme financial incentives invite ex-
treme distortions. Yet financial incentives are not nec-
essary for cost control and are expensive to administer.
A single-payer system like Canada's limits entrepre-
neurial rewards and penalties, covers everyone, and
saves much on bureaucracy and profits. The public
budgetary ceilings that constrain costs bring doctors
and patients into conflict with budget setters (and tax-
payers), but not with each other. Salaried practice in
nonprofit, community-controlled regional plans might
achieve even better results.
Until such reforms are carried out, many physicians
scrambling to preserve their careers will be tempted or
forced into the corporate embrace. But if we shun the
sick or withhold information to benefit ourselves, we con-
spire in the demise of our profession. Let us not end up
like tobacco-company executives, who, repenting their
sins, find that their contracts forbid confessing them.
STEFFIE WOOLHANDLER, M.D., M.P.H.
DAVID U. HIMMELSTEIN, M.D.